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Professor Coven believes that the education 
assistance provisions enacted in 1997, while long 
overdue, were ill-considered and poorly con-
structed. Focusing on what should have been the 
simple question of who is entitled to claim an 
education tax credit, this report illustrates the 
harm that inadequate drafting produces. While 
section 25A appeared to deny a credit to a de-
pendent child, an unfair and unwise result, the 
proposed regulations allow parents to shift the 
credit to their children but only on the forfeiture 
of the deduction for the personal exemption. That 
rule, says Coven, imposes a harsh penalty on low-
and middle-income taxpayers but no penalty at 
all on high-income taxpayers. Neither result is 
consistent with the overall aim of the education 
credits. 
This report is an excerpt from a broader study 
of the drafting deficiencies in the educational as-
sistance provisions currently being undertaken 
by the author. Because of the poor quality of these 
sections, considerable corrective legislation will 
be required to fulfill the promise of the 1997 legis-
lation. 
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WHO SHOULD BE ENTITLED 
TO CLAIM THE NEW 
EDUCATION CREDITS? 
by Glenn E. Coven 
In 1997 Congress at long last undertook to provide 
some relief from the spiraling costs of higher educa-
tion. Naturally, the relief was extended through the 
income tax system and assumed a variety of forms. The 
central feature of the new legislation1 was the adoption 
in section 25A of two types of education tax credits. As 
has become characteristic of tax legislation, section 25A 
and the other education assistance provisions were 
very poorly designed and executed. One particularly 
ill-considered aspect of this legislation was the seem-
ingly simple question of who is to be entitled to claim 
the new credits. In most families, after all, both the 
parents and the child make some contribution to the 
cost of higher education. This problem, of course, is 
not new. Dependent children who earn income have 
always incurred deductible expenses, some of which 
were paid by the child and some of which were paid 
by the parents. The treatment of these payments has 
always been governed by the generally applicable rules 
of taxation. 
In drafting the educational credits, however, Con-
gress ignored that traditional approach and adopted 
instead a series of novel solutions to the problem of 
allocating tax allowances between parents and their 
dependent children. Those solutions were terribly mis-
guided. In an valiant effort to make sense out of this 
legislation, the Treasury has issued proposed regula-
tions containing solutions that are equally novel and 
equally misguided. The difficulties with this 
statutory /regulatory approach to the allocation of 
credits are catalogued here in the hope that the section 
25A approach does not spread to other legislation. 
I. The Education Credits at a Glance 
For no very important reason, section 25A creates 
two distinct credits. The rather misleadingly named 
HOPE scholarship credit reimburses 100 percent of the 
first $1,000 of education expenses and 50 percent of the 
next $1,000 for a maximum credit of $1,500. The credit 
may be claimed without limit for each eligible student 
lIn addition, section 530 added an IRA-like savings account 
for education expenses and section 220 allows a limited 
deduction for interest on loans for education. Section refer-
ences are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, 
and the regulations thereunder. 
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but is only available, in general, for each of the first 
two years of college-level education. The Lifetime 
learning credit is equal to 20 percent of education ex-
penses to a maximum of $5,000 ($10,000 after 2002) and 
can be claimed in an unlimited number of years (but 
not with respect to the expenses of a student for which 
a HOPE credit is claimed). The Lifetime credit is a 
per-taxpayer credit; the $5,000 or $10,000 ceiling ap-
plies without regard to the number of students that the 
taxpayer is supporting. For both credits, the expenses 
for which credit may be claimed are limited to tuition 
and most fees paid by the taxpayer for the education 
of the taxpayer, his or her spouse, and any dependent 
and excludes expenses paid by a tax free receipt (such 
as a scholarship) other than a gift. The ability to claim 
either credit is phased out for taxpayers having ad-
justed gross income (AGI) in excess of $80,000 on a joint 
return and disappears at $100,000. There are, of course, 
a number of other rules governing the credit, some of 
which are the subject of the following remarks. 
II. Who Gets the Credit and for What 
In allocating the education credits between parents 
and child, section 25A embodies an all-or-nothing ap-
proach: in any given year, only one taxpayer can claim 
an education credit for any given student. The identity 
of that taxpayer depends on whether a dependency 
exemption for the student is allowed to another tax-
payer. If the exemption for the student is allowed to 
another, the student is barred from claiming any educa-
tion credit - even if the student actually pays his or 
her own expenses out of his or her own earned income.2 
Rather, the credit must be claimed by the person to 
whom the dependency exemption is allowed. On the 
other hand, if the exemption is not allowed to another, 
no one but the student may claim the credit. Just when 
a dependency exemption "is allowed" to another tax-
payer is discussed below. 
When the credits are to be claimed by someone other 
than the student, the credit for expenses actually paid 
by the student is not necessarily lost. Under section 
25A(g)(3)(B), in this situation, expenses paid by the 
child are treated as if they had been paid by the parent 
(or other person entitled to the dependency exemp-
tion), thus entitling the parent to claim a credit for 
those expenses. The code thus assigns to the parent the 
income tax benefit for expenses paid by a child out of 
the child's own funds. 
When the student is not a dependent and thus must 
claim his or her own credits, the code lacks a com-
parable rule attributing the expenses paid by the parent 
to the student. While this different statutory treatment 
might suggest a different result, the proposed regula-
tions do not take that approach. Rather, under prop. 
reg. section 1.25A-5(a), education expenses of a student 
that are paid by a third party, normally the parent, are 
treated as if they passed through the hands of the stu-
dent. Thus, the third party is treated as making a gift 
to the student and the student is treated as paying his 
or her own expenses. That treatment entitles the stu-
2Section 2SA(g)(3)(A). 
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dent to claim the education credit for his or her educa-
tion expenses that are in fact paid by another (unless, 
of course, the student is a dependent of another in 
which event the expenses are re-treated as paid by that 
other person3) . Although the regulations are not suffi-
ciently clear on the point, presumably the rule of 5(a) 
would be applicable regardless of the fact that it is the 
parent that is legally obligated to the educational in-
stitution to pay the expenses. 
A. The Novelty of the Allocation Rule 
In barring the claiming of credits by one for whom 
the personal exemption is allowed on the return of 
another, Congress may have thought that it was fol-
lowing an established precedent. It wasn't. No other 
section of the code disallows a tax benefit for an out of 
pocket expenditure to a taxpayer simply because that 
taxpayer could be claimed as a dependent on another's 
tax return. Section 151(d)(2) bars an individual from 
deducting his or her own personal exemption if 
another taxpayer may also deduct a personal exemp-
tion attributable to that individual. The personal ex-
emption, however, does not reflect a specific disburse-
ment. In fact, the exemption is really an aspect of the 
rate structure and functionally imposes a zero rate of 
tax on the first slice of income. Section 151(d)(2) quite 
appropriately bars a second exemption to a child when 
an exemption has already been claimed by the parent. 
In barring the claiming of credits by 
one for whom the personal exemption 
may be claimed on the return of 
another, Congress may have thought 
that it was following an established 
precedent. It wasn't. 
Section 63(c)(5) limits the use of the standard deduc-
tion to offset tax on the investment income of an in-
dividual who can be claimed as a dependent on the 
return of another. Again, this provision does not pro-
vide a tax benefit for a specific expenditure. Today's 
standard deduction is designed to provide a measure 
of tax relief to low-income taxpayers who lack specific 
personal deductions. Section 63(c)(5) reflects the entire-
ly reasonable decision to discourage certain income 
splitting techniques by denying that relief to the un-
earned income of minors. 
A similar disallowance is contained in section 220. 
That section, added in 1996, allows on an experimental 
basis a deduction for amounts contributed to medical 
savings accounts. The funds accumulated in such an 
account may be used to pay the medical expenses of 
the taxpayer and his or her dependents. Under section 
220(b)(6), dependent children are barred from creating 
3Seriously. The proposed regulations give this example. 
Child is a claimed dependent of divorced Morn. Ex-Hubby 
pays Child's tuition. Who gets the credit? Morn! See prop. reg. 
section 1.2SA-S(b)(2). The rule is favorable to taxpayers be-
cause it preserves the credit but otherwise makes no logical 
sense at all. 
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their own accounts. That decision, while perhaps not 
entirely beyond criticism, still does not bar a child from 
deducting an out-of-pocket expenditure. Rather, sec-
tion 220 bars dependent children from making an ex-
penditure by denying them the opportunity to estab-
lish a medical savings account. Significantly, if such a 
child does have a medical expense that the child in fact 
pays out of his or her own funds, the child at that time 
is entitled to a deduction under section 213. 
I This new rule governing the allocation of the education credits is objectionable for a series of reasons. 
The extension of this concept in section 25A, there-
fore, is novel. Unlike its predecessors, the education 
credit is the first instance in which expenses of a de-
pendent child, paid by the child, have been reallocated 
to another. In spite of the significance of this change in 
the manner of taxing family income, there is no indica-
tion that the drafters of section 25A considered the 
desirability of this approach or the extent to which it 
should be extended to other provisions. Indeed, there 
is no indication that the drafters even were aware that 
they were adopting a novel tax concept. 
B. Objections to the Allocation Rule 
This new rule governing the allocation of the educa-
tion credits is objectionable for a series of reasons. 
1. A rule that denies a taxpayer the tax benefit from his 
or her own expenses and gives that benefit to another 
is, and will be perceived by taxpayers as, unfair. Of 
course, an amateur economist could explain that the 
credit is just as valuable, maybe more valuable,4 in the 
hands of the parent as in the hands of the child. How-
ever, the arguments would not have impressed my chil-
dren and, I suspect, will not impress many others. 
Rather, this provision will leave many new taxpayers 
believing themselves to have been cheated out of a tax 
credit, thus planting a seed of hostility toward the tax 
system in the application of a provision that should 
have left the student with a friendly feeling. 
2. The assignment of income doctrine, which requires 
each taxpayer to report his or her own items of income 
and expense, is a central protection of the integrity of 
the code. The rules that flow from that doctrine have 
the effect of stemming taxpayer manipulations calcu-
lated to avoid the progressive rate structure or other-
wise improperly reduce tax liability by engaging in 
transactions that lack economic substance. Section 
25A(g)(3) requires a clear and egregious violation of 
that rule. One taxpayer is given a tax benefit for a loss 
economically incurred by another. For Congress to re-
quire, or even authorize, violations of such fundamen-
tal ~ule~ is highly undesirable. It is difficult enough to 
mamtam taxpayer respect for broad anti-tax avoidance 
4After all, one must have an income tax liability before 
credits are of any value. 
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doctrines without Congress deliberately undermining 
them. 
3. This violation of the assignment of income rules is 
particularly unfortunate because it creates internal in-
consistency within the code. In other, quite similar 
areas, the normal assignment of income rules apply. 
That means that in closely related areas under the tax 
law, two sharply inconsistent results are required. 
Thus, when a dependent child pays his medical ex-
p~nses, he .is entitled to a ~eduction but when he pays 
hIS educatlOn expenses, hIS parent is entitled to the 
credit. Such inconsistent rules are an obvious and 
wholly unnecessary source of complexity and taxpayer 
confusion. 
4. In treating expenses paid by the parent as if they 
were paid by the child, the regulations have suspended 
the application of a second important anti-tax avoid-
ance rule, the step transaction doctrine. In the absence 
of this regulation, a parent wishing to cause a child to 
be treated as having paid certain education expenses 
would face a significant hurdle. If the parent trans-
ferred funds to the child that the child promptly 
retransferred to the educational institution, a routine 
application of the step transaction doctrine might well 
bar the desired result. Since the child would be acting 
as a mere conduit and the funds did not come to rest 
in the hands of the child, the child's involvement in the 
transaction would be ignored and the payment treated 
as passing directly from the parent to the institution. 
Since the child would not be regarded as paying the 
expense, the child would not be entitled to any credit. 
The regulations evidently suspend the application 
of the step transaction doctrine in this context. Even 
though the child may play the role of the most embar-
rassingly obvious conduit, the tax law will treat the child 
as the bona fide payor of the expense and entitled to the 
resulting tax benefit. Of course, the application of the step 
transaction doctrine in this intra-family context would be 
difficult, as its application usually is. And, the application 
would also produce a harsh result. If the credit must be 
claimed by the student but the expenses are paid by the 
parent, the credit for those expenses would be lost absent 
the regulatory rule. Nevertheless, undermining the 
validity of the step transaction doctrine is as short-sighted 
as is the undermining of the assignment of income 
doctrine. If these rules are to be waived by the govern-
ment for little or no reason, taxpayers will find in that 
justification for ignoring the application of those rules in 
other contexts. 
5. The code expressly attributes payments by the child 
to the parent; it quite clearly does not attribute pay-
ments by the parent to the child. Obviously, the distinct 
possibility exists that these different rules were the 
result of an oversight by the drafter of section 25A. 
Nevertheless, the code plainly adopts a different rule 
which the regulations plainly ignore. The regulation 
would thus seem to strain the boundaries of the Trea-
sury's interpretative authority. Significantly, the rule 
indi~ated by congressional silence is that taxpayers are 
reqUlred to report their own expenditures and it is that 
fundamental rule that the Treasury regulations ignore. 
Perhaps the boundaries have been breached. 
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III. When Is an Exemption I Allowed' to Another? 
Wrongly or not, section 25A(g)(3) denies an educa-
tion credit to a student if the deduction for the personal 
exemption attributable to the student "is allowed" to 
another. Just what the drafters of section 25A meant by 
"is allowed" is an interesting question. Under the an-
tecedent sections 151(d) and 63(c), the respective allow-
ances are barred to an individual if the personal ex-
emption for that individual is "allowable" to another. 
Under those sections, it is well established that "allow-
able" means "entitled to claim the benefit whether or 
not it is in fact claimed and whether or not it does the 
taxpayer any good."s The principal practical effect of 
the use of "allowable" in section 151 arises in connec-
tion with the phaseout of the personal exemption. 
Under section 151(d)(3), the ability to deduct this 
allowance is reduced for taxpayers whose adjusted 
gross income on a joint return exceeds about $190,000 
and entirely disappears when income exceeds about 
$312,000. As the value of the child's personal exemp-
tion disappears, the high-income parents cannot pass 
the deduction to the child by foregoing the deduction 
on their own return. Because the personal exemption 
was "allowable" to the parent, although not in fact 
claimed, the child remains barred from claiming his or 
her own personal exemption. Thus the use of "allow-
able" in section 151 prevents the avoidance of the 
phase-out rules . 
I Just what the drafters of section 25A meant by 'is aI/owed' is an interesting question. 
In paragraph (g)(3) of section 25A, however, Con-
gress used different language. The credits are not 
barred to a child if a deduction for the child's personal 
exemption is "allowable" to another; rather, they are 
barred if the deduction "is allowed" to another. Did 
that different choice of language signal a different 
meaning? In the portions of the code that address 
depreciation and the resulting adjustments to basis, 
such as section 1016, the words "allowed" and "allow-
able" are given distinct meanings. Allowable means the 
proper amount of depreciation prescribed by law while 
allowed means the amount of depreciation actually 
taken on the income tax return, which may be more or 
less than the amount properly allowable.6 If this mean-
ing of allowed applied to the use of that word in section 
25A, it would suggest that the education credits are 
barred to a child only if the parent actually claimed the 
personal exemption for the child - regardless of 
whether the deduction was allowable. 
On the other hand, elsewhere in the code allowed 
does not seem to have been given such a specialized 
meaning but rather is used in its conventional sense of 
meaning permitted. Illustrations occur in virtually 
5See IRS, Tax Rules for Children and Dependents (Pub. 929), 
p.5. 
6See sections 1016(a)(2) and 1245(a)(2) . 
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every section of the code. Indeed, when allowed is used 
in this sense, it is sometimes used interchangeably with 
allowable.7 If section 25A is using allowed in this sense 
to mean permitted, then education credits are barred 
to a child if the parents are permitted to claim the 
child's personal exemption regardless of whether they 
do. 
The legislative history is of no help. In describing 
section 25A(g)(3), the reports refer to whether the tax-
payer "claims" the student as a dependent, which 
might be read as supporting the section 1016 meaning 
of allowed.s However, section 24, which extends the 
child tax credit, was enacted along with section 25A 
and like that section conditions its relief on whether 
the taxpayer is "allowed" a deduction for the child's 
personal exemption.9 In describing that provision, the 
reports refer to whether the taxpayer "can claim" the 
deduction!l0 
The proposed regulations to section 25A(g)(3) adopt 
the section 1016 meaning of allowed. Under section 
1.25A-1(g), if a taxpayer is eligible to claim a student 
as a dependent but does not, then the personal exemp-
tion is not treated as "allowed" to the taxpayer. Accord-
ingly, paragraph (g)(3) does not apply and the student 
can claim the education credit for the costs of his or 
her own education. In the process of creating this rule, 
the regulations invent the new concept of a "claimed 
dependent." A claimed dependent, of course, is a de-
pendent for whom the taxpayer actually claims the 
ded uction for the personal exemption on the tax-
payer's return,u Presumably, if the taxpayer could 
have, but did not, claim the deduction, the dependent 
is "unclaimed." Apparently, taxpayers are permitted to 
switch the status of their dependents from claimed to 
unclaimed annually without limitation but the regula-
tions are silent on that point. 
The proposed regulations do not address, at least 
not expressly, the painfully obvious issue of the inter-
action of the concept of a claimed dependent and the 
phaseout of the deduction for the personal exemption. 
Section 1.25A-1(g) only rather vaguely states that if a 
taxpayer "is eligible to, but does not, claim" the child, 
then the child is unclaimed. One can only guess that if 
a deduction has been fully phased out for the taxpayer, 
then the taxpayer is not "eligible" to claim the depend-
ent, although that is far from clear. Reading the 
proposed regulation in this manner, if the deduction 
for a child's personal exemption has been reduced to, 
say, $54 by the phase-out of the allowance, the child 
7Compare, e.g., section 32(a)(2) ("the amount of the credit 
allowable ... under paragraph (I)") with section 221(b)(1) 
("the deduction allowed by subsection (an. 
sJt. Comm. on Taxation, General Explanation of Tax Legisla-
tion Enacted in 1997, 105th Cong, 1st Sess., p . 15 (1997) . 
9Section 24(c)(I)(A). 
IOJt. Comm. on Taxation, General Explanation of Tax Legis-
lation Enacted in 1997, 105th Cong, 1st Sess., p. 7 (1997) . 
IIActually, the regulations with infuriating ambiguity 
define a claimed dependent as one for whom the personal 
exemption is "allowed" to the taxpayer but we know what 
they mean. Prop. reg . section 1.25A-2(a). 
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remains a claimed dependent. However, if the deduc-
tion is reduced to zero, the child automatically becomes 
an unclaimed dependent. 
If these regulations correctly interpret section 
25A(g)(3), then the allocation of the education credit 
between parent and child is elective and that election 
is fully within the control of the parties. Maybe so, but 
there is no indication in the committee reports that 
Congress understood that paragraph (g)(3) created an 
election. Certainly it would have been unconscionably 
devious for Congress to create a surprising and sig-
nificant rule but communicate its existence only 
through a subtle and ambiguous word ending. It seems 
more likely that the drafters of section 25A never 
thought matters through this far and that the elective 
feature is one dreamed up by the Treasury as a means 
of blunting the harshness of the congressional denial 
of the credit to a dependent child who pays his or her 
own way. 
IV. Deficiencies in the Elective Allocation 
Whether this election is one intended by Congress 
or manufactured by the Treasury, however, it is both 
novel and very poorly constructed. It is novel because 
Congress has not previously treated the status of a 
dependent for whom the personal exemption can be 
claimed by another as an election within the control of 
that other taxpayer. It is poorly constructed for all of 
the following reasons. 
A. The Inherent Complexity of Elections 
Elections, while normally appearing favorable to 
taxpayers, generally reflect bad policy and are not in 
the best interests of taxpayers . The very existence of an 
election creates complexity and mandates tax planning 
with its attendant expense. In addition, elections un-
dermine the notion that tax issues have a correct 
answer and create situations in which a single set of 
facts may produce two different tax liabilities. In these 
respects, elections tend to undermine the integrity of 
the income tax and encourage taxpayer manipulation. 
Even for one more favorably inclined towards elec-
tions, this election is particularly unfortunate. 
B. Intentional Forfeiture of the Personal Exemption? 
The notion that allowed means actually claimed per-
mits the parent to shift the education credits to the 
student/ child by failing to claim the personal exemp-
tion for the child on their (the parent's) return. But, the 
personal exemption itself, of course, is denied to the 
child if the deduction for their personal exemption is 
allowable to another. Accordingly, if the parent does 
forgo the deduction for the personal exemption, the 
child nevertheless cannot claim that allowance - it is 
permanently lost to all. The proposition then that 
allowed means claimed is that, in the context of legis-
lation designed to assist families and particularly to 
assist in paying the costs of education, Congress 
allowed the education credits to be claimed by the 
student but only at the price of forfeiting the student's 
personal exemption. Even for this Congress, that 
would be bizarre. 
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It would also be manifestly unfair. If an elective 
shifting of the education credit is to be allowed, it is 
not necessarily inappropriate to attach a reasonable 
cost or penalty to the making of that election. However, 
the forfeiture of the personal exemption is not such a 
penalty. It is grossly unreasonable and will he so 
viewed by taxpayers. Not only is the amount of the 
penalty imposed excessive, a point illustrated below, 
but the loss of the personal exemption for the very 
student whose education expenses the new provisions 
are designed to defray is, and will appear to taxpayers, 
as senseless and counterproductive, another instance 
of being shortchanged by Congress. 
I It is the forfeiture of the personal exemption to all that makes the regulatory interpretation of section 25A(g)(3) distinctly unfair. 
It must be underscored that the overall result of this 
elective shifting of the credit is not at all similar to the 
mandatory shifting of the credit to the student / child 
that will occur when the child is no longer a dependent. 
At that point, the parent loses the deduction for the 
child's personal exemption and is no longer able to 
claim education credits attributable to the child. 
Rather, the student must claim his or her own educa-
tion credits. However, here the deduction for the per-
sonal exemption is not forfeited; the child can now 
deduct his or her own exemption. It is the forfeiture of 
the personal exemption to all that makes the regulatory 
interpretation of section 25A(g)(3) distinctly unfair. 
It would also be expensive. At the 28 percent bracket, 
which is the bracket in which many parents of college-age 
students find themselves, a deduction for the current 
exemption of $2,700 results in a tax savings of $756. 
For such a taxpayer, forfeiting the personal exemption 
means increasing one's tax liability by that amount. On 
the other hand, the maximum HOPE credit that can be 
claimed for a single child is only $1,500 (and the max-
imum Lifetime credit is currently only $1,000) . If a 
parent in that tax bracket shifted the entitlement to a 
HOPE credit to a child, the net benefit obtained by the 
family from the credit would be $1,500 less $756, or 
$744. Accordingly, the proposition asserted by the reg-
ulations is that Congress did allow shifting the educa-
tion credit to the children but, if that occurred, the 
value of the credit was to be halved. That result is 
simply ridiculous and it is just very hard to believe that 
it was intended by Congress. Of course, it might have 
been that the drafters of section 25A did intend that 
parents could shift the credit to their children but they 
forgot that parents cannot shift the personal exemption 
itself! Hard to say. 
C. A Deliberate Undermining of the Limitations? 
There are two obvious reasons why a parent might 
wish to shift the credit to the child. One is the non-tax 
factor of family harmony. Older children tend to be-
come incensed when they discover that they must pay 
a tax on relatively meager earned income (not to men-
tion trivial amounts of savings account interest) be-
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cause their parents get the deduction for their personal 
exemption. When those children discover that they 
cannot get an education credit with respect to amounts 
of their own income that they have used to pay their 
education expenses, their irritation will, on occasion, 
arise to a sufficient level that it will be in the interest 
of the family for the parents to shift the credit. In this 
connection, it seems likely that the resulting irritation 
of the children and of their parents will immediately 
be redirected toward the tax law and the IRS. Dumb 
rules like this one must have a great deal to do with 
the taxpayer antagonism toward the payment of taxes 
that is currently giving the IRS such fits. 
The second reason, however, is that the credit is 
worth more to the children than it is to the parent. In 
general, of course, credits are equally valuable to all 
taxpayers. However, there are several reasons why the 
education credits might be more valuable to the child 
than to the parent. Among these explanations, the two 
most likely are that the parent's ability to claim the 
credit was limited by the $5,000 (or $10,000) ceiling on 
the Lifetime credit or, in the hands of the parent, the 
credit was subject to a phaseout. Shifting the credit to 
the child, therefore, will often be a tax planning device, 
undertaken for the purpose of avoiding the quite 
specific and deliberate limitations on the use of the 
credit that were inserted in section 25A. In this context 
the proposition is that Congress created a series of 
relatively strict limitations on the availability of the 
credit but then created a scheme through which those 
limitations could be avoided by well advised taxpayers 
but only if the taxpayer was willing to pay a toll charge 
in the nature of relinquishing the personal exemption 
for the student. 
I When the effect of the phaseout of the deduction for the personal exemption is introduced into the equation, the scheme becomes utterly indefensible. 
Consider, for example, the simple case of a family 
whose children include 22-year-old twins who are both 
juniors in college. The parents are entitled to two per-
sonal exemptions with respect to those children, each 
producing a tax reduction of $756, and a Lifetime credit 
(in 2003) for educational expenses of $10,000, resulting 
in a credit of $2,000. However, each child has eligible 
expenses of $8,000, so education expenses of $6,000 are 
not creditable. Under the solution contained in the reg-
ulations, the parent may give up the personal exemp-
tion for one twin, in which event the parent will also 
lose a credit of $400 on the expenses of $2,000 at-
tributable to that child. However, the child may now 
take a credit on all $8,000 of her expenses, which would 
be worth $1,600 - provided that the child has a suffi-
cient income tax liability to absorb such a credit. If that 
income exists, the $1,600 credit available to the child 
will likely be worth more than the $1,176 ($400 plus 
$756) tax savings lost by the parent. Parents able to 
work out this result, therefore, would be well advised 
to "unclaim" one of the twins. 
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Such a scheme, whether deliberately designed or 
resulting from drafter inattention, would be objec-
tionable on several grounds. (a) If the limitations on 
the availability of the credit are worth having, they 
should not be avoidable with the help of an accountant. 
(b) The scheme is complex and its existence means that 
to obtain maximum benefit from the education credits, 
taxpayers must be willing and able to engage in fairly 
sophisticated tax planning. Given the number of tax-
payers affected by this provision whose tax returns 
otherwise would be generally uncomplicated, that 
result is highly unfortunate. (c) While a shift of the 
credit may increase the tax savings to the family, in 
many instances the forfeiture of the personal exemp-
tion is an excessive price for this benefit. However, 
when the effect of the phaseout of the deduction for 
the personal exemption is introduced into the equation, 
the scheme becomes utterly indefensible. 
D. A Toll Charge Targeted at the Poor? 
Losing the deduction for the personal exemption is 
a cost only if a taxpayer has the deduction at the start. 
Because the deduction is subject to one of the ever-
present phase outs, not all taxpayers do have a deduc-
tion for personal exemptions to lose. Those taxpayers, 
accordingly, can shift the education credits to their chil-
dren without the imposition of a toll charge. This in-
teraction of the phaseout of the personal exemption 
with the phaseout of the education credits and the 
ability to shift that credit to the child produces a result 
that is plainly inconsistent with the expressed design 
of the new provisions. 
On a joint return, the education credits are phased 
out for taxpayers having an AGI between $80,000 and 
$100,000. Below that level, parents may obtain a full 
benefit from the credit without shifting it to the chil-
dren. After that income level is reached, however, the 
only way that any benefit can be obtained is if the 
credits can be shifted to the children.12 On the other 
hand, the deduction for the personal exemption begins 
to phase out on a joint return for 1998 when AGI 
reaches $189,950. Until that income level is reached, 
shifting the education credits to the child requires 
giving up the full tax benefit of the personal exemption. 
When AGI rises to $312,450, the personal exemption is 
entirely phased out. Accordingly, as income increases 
from about $190,000 to about $310,000, shifting the 
education credits to the child "costs" a decreasing 
amount. Ultimately, the resulting loss of the personal 
exemption costs nothing at all since that deduction has 
been completely phased out and is no longer there to 
lose. The result of all this, in round numbers, goes 
something like this: Taxpayers earning $125,000 can 
shift the HOPE credit of $1,500 to their children if they 
pay a toll charge of $800,13 which results in a net tax 
benefit from the credit of $700. Taxpayers earning 
J2The same need to shift the credits can occur at lower 
income levels if the taxpayer encounters the ceiling on the 
Lifetime credit or one of the other limitations of the ability to 
benefit from the credits. 
13The value of a $2,700 personal exemption to one in the 
31 percent bracket, which begins at a taxable income of 
$104,050, is $837. 
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$250,000, entitled to only one-half the benefit of the 
personal exemption, can shift the credit at a cost of 
about $480, which results in a net benefit of $1,020. 
Taxpayers earning over $375,000 can shift the credit at 
no cost and thus the family as a whole will continue 
to derive a full tax benefit of $1,500 after the parents 
have shifted the tax credit to their children by forego-
ing the (nonexistent) personal exemption. Accordingly, 
as income rises, the value of the education credits that 
have been shifted to dependent children also rises. 
Imposing a reasonable toll charge on the transfer of 
the education credits to dependents may not be the best 
policy but it is not inherently irrational. However, im-
posing a toll charge that burdens only low- and middle-
income taxpayers is. And imposing a toll charge but 
exempting high-income taxpayers from its scope is 
simply unacceptable. It follows that the elective 
scheme for shifting the education credit as developed 
in the proposed regulations is not acceptable. 
The ability of high-income taxpayers to shift the 
education credits to their children cost free has further 
implications. While on the face of section 25A it ap-
pears that the benefit of the education credits is phased 
out as income rises, that turns out to be illusory. To the 
extent that the education credits can be shifted to other 
members of the family, such as the student in question, 
without a loss in value, the actual benefit from those 
credits has not been phased out. Such a shift of the 
benefit of the credits can occur if (a) the student is 
treated as paying his or her own education expenses 
even though he or she does not, (b) the student is 
entitled to claim the education credit, (c) the student 
has a sufficient tax liability to absorb the credit, and 
(d) the parent is not subject to any penalty on yielding 
the credit to the student. As discussed above, all those 
requirements are readily met under the proposed reg-
ulations for very-high-income families. Accordingly, 
the apparent phaseout of the education credit has no 
practical application to high-income taxpayers. Rather, 
the phaseout of the education credits applies only to 
the category of taxpayers whose AGI falls between 
$80,000 (the start of the phaseout of the education 
credits on a joint return) and $312,000 (the end of the 
phaseout of the personal exemption). 
V. Toward a Better Approach 
The drafters of section 25A did not need to develop 
a new scheme for allocating the tax benefit from the 
payment of expenses of dependent children. This issue 
has been addressed under the code since the inception 
of the income tax in a manner entirely consistent with 
fundamental principles of taxation. Under the general 
scheme of the tax law, children, including minor, de-
pendent children, are taxpayers in their own right, en-
tirely distinct from their parents. If their income 
achieves the same levels applicable to adults, they are 
required to file their own income tax returns, reporting 
their own income and claiming their own deductions.14 
14IRS, Tax Rules for Children and Dependents (Pub. 929), p. 4, 
and Bittker & McMahon, Federal Income Taxation of Individuals, 
para. 34.5[3]. 
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While authorities are scant, it is firmly established that 
when the child pays its own expenses, whether personal 
or business-related, the child, and only the child, can 
deduct those expenditures regardless of whether the 
source of the payment is the child's own funds or funds 
supplied by the parent.15 Indeed, absent specific statutory 
authority, even where the parent pays expenses of the 
child, the deduction for those expenses belongs to the 
child and cannot be claimed by the parents.16 
The code section that would seem to contains the 
closest analogy17 to education expenses is section 213 
which grants a deduction for medical expenses. Under 
that section, like section 25A, a taxpayer is entitled to 
a deduction for medical expense of the taxpayer, his or 
her spouse, and of any dependent paid by the taxpayer. 
Thus, where a parent pays the medical expense of a 
dependent child, the parent, by virtue of this specific 
statutory provision, is entitled to deduct the payment. 
However, if the child pays its own expenses, the deduc-
tion is not attributed to the parent. Rather, the deduc-
tion must be claimed by the child and may not be 
claimed by the parent. In short, each taxpayer, parent 
or child, deducts the expenses they pay - and only 
the expenses they pay. 
Initially, section 25A should be amended to delete 
the mistreatment of dependent children contained in 
subsection (g)(3) and to replace that rule with the tradi-
tional approach currently applied to medical expenses. 
If the amendment stopped at that, all taxpayers would 
be able to avoid the ceilings and phaseouts that under 
current law only high-income taxpayers can avoid. 
That alone would be an improvement. To go beyond 
that point and seek to apply the limitations on the 
availability of the credit applicable to the parent to the 
disbursements of the child will require careful con-
sideration of the general question of the taxation of the 
family, an issue far broader than section 25A. 
VI. Conclusion 
The education assistance provisions enacted in 1997 
were quite poorly constructed. They produce an end-
less series of harsh or foolish results, one of which is 
outlined here. In a decent attempt to correct some of 
the worst features of the statute, the proposed regula-
tions have offered some creative interpretations of sec-
tion 25A. But, acting within the limits of the regulatory 
process, the Treasury cannot make a silk purse out of 
this sow's ear. Indeed, it may have made matters worse. 
The unavoidable conclusion, therefore, is that the col-
lection of education assistance provisions deserves 
more serious congressional attention. 
15GCM 33678 (Nov. 6, 1967). 
16Section 73 and Harrison v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1978-476 
(parents denied deduction for business expenses of minor 
children paid by parent) . 
17Under section l(g) the unearned income of a child under 
the age of 14 is taxed at a rate geared to the income of the 
parent. However, in general this income and any related ex-
penses remain reportable by the child. To that rule, section 
1(g)(7) provides a highly restricted election to report minor 
amounts of the investment income of a child directly on the 
tax return of the parent. 
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